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¶1 This Article begins by recording the history of the development of juvenile justice 
in the United States and explores the extent to which that system influenced South 
Africa‘s child justice system.  The Article argues that because South Africa never fully 
embraced a separate juvenile justice model children were subjected to the mainstream 
criminal justice system in South Africa during the whole of the twentieth century.
1
  The 
end of apartheid, however, created opportunities for transformation of the law.  This 
Article explains why, at that time, the United States was not setting a positive example 
for reformers to follow.  Finally, this article explores more positive developments in both 
countries since 2005, particularly in relation to sentencing children for serious crimes. 
II. EARLY CHILD JUSTICE REFORM 
¶2 Sociologist Ellen Key, writing at the turn of the century, predicted that the 
twentieth century would be the ―century of the child.‖2  During the preceding century, 
welfare-oriented individuals and organizations had founded reformatories and industrial 
schools as alternatives to prison or deportation for children who had committed crimes.
 3
  
By 1867, sixty-four reformatories had been established in England, Scotland, and Wales.  
During the same period, seventy-nine industrial schools had been created.
4
  In 1867, New 
Zealand passed the Neglected and Criminal Children‘s Act, empowering provincial 
authorities to found industrial schools.
5
  Massachusetts had developed a probation 
                                               
* Northwestern University School of Law, Children and Family Justice Center‘s 20th Anniversary 
Symposium, ―Seize the Moment: Justice for the Child,‖ presented in partnership with the Northwestern 
Journal of Law and Social Policy, October 7–8, 2010. 
** Director of the Centre for Child Law at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.  LLD (Doctor of Law), 
University of Pretoria, South Africa.  Doctor Skelton chaired the South African Law Reform Committee 
that drafted the Bill which culminated in the Child Justice Act.  Doctor Skelton can be contacted at 
ann.skelton@up.ac.za.  Acknowledgments to Violet Odala for her research assistance. 
1 In many respects children were treated like smaller versions of adult offenders, with some special 
provisions relating to privacy, the possibility of referral to the care system, the recognition of youth as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing, and some special sentencing provisions. 
2 ELLEN KEY, THE CENTURY OF THE CHILD 45 (1909). 
3 See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 51 (1999) 
(describing these early reforms as important because, although they were later criticized for over-reliance 
on institutionalization, the reformers insisted on the separation of child and adult offenders within those 
institutions, recognized the inter-connectedness of delinquency and neglect and stressed the responsibility 
of the state towards its children). 
4 JAMES MIDGLEY, CHILDREN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 16 (1975). 
5 Id. at 19. 
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system, and by 1891, the state required court-employed probation officers to be appointed 
in criminal cases involving children.
6
   
¶3 The people behind these reforms were known as ―child savers,‖ and as the 
twentieth century drew to a close, two of them, Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop, worked 
tirelessly to introduce the first juvenile court in the world in Cook County, Illinois.
7
   It is 
now well understood that the central idea of this movement, embodied in the Illinois 
Juvenile Court Act of 1899, was that neglected, dependent, and delinquent children 
should all be dealt with in a separate children‘s court: ―A sympathetic judge could now 
use his discretion to apply individualized treatments to rehabilitate children, instead of 
punish them.‖8 
¶4 The first ideas about a separate justice system for children were thus firmly rooted 
in a welfarist approach,
9
 the rise of which coincided with the rise of behavioral sciences 
such as social work and psychology.
10
  A related transatlantic social movement in the 
1880s and 1890s was concerned about the effect of market processes and industrialization 
on the social lives of urban populations.
11
  Its advocates viewed individual responsibility 
as an incomplete explanation for the widespread disorder in modern cities.
12
  They 
questioned the conception of free will on which the liberal state was being built, de-
emphasized individual choice, and re-described crime and poverty as environmental 
problems, the root causes of which needed to be understood and resolved.
13
  Thus it is 
often said that the welfarist approach focused on the child‘s needs rather than on the 
child‘s deeds.14  Welfarism promoted the idea that children should be separated from 
adults, both in court and in institutions, and that they should be treated according to 
different procedures from those used for adults.  The movement relied heavily on the 
involvement of social workers and probation officers. 
                                               
6 David Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of 
the Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 47 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, 
Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002).  
7 The first juvenile court was inspired by two women, and the driving forces behind it in its early years 
were two other women, Jane Addams and Florence Kelley.  One of the first probation officers at the court 
was also a woman, Ida Barnett Wells.  Its first woman judge, Mary Bartelme, adjudicated girls cases from 
1913 and was appointed as the presiding judge for the Chicago Juvenile Court in the 1920s.  See 
Bernardine Dohrn, All Ellas: Girls Locked Up, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 302 (2004). 
8 Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 42. 
9 Although the Chicago model, also known as the ―Cook County‖ model, is considered the most influential 
in juvenile justice reform, it is clear that welfarist thinking was already underway in many parts of the 
world.  Midgley points out that  
[t]he Norwegian Act of 1896 which established that country‘s child welfare panels was 
drafted in 1892.  Johnson argued that were it not for certain administrative delays, 
Canada would have created a juvenile court before Cook County.  South Australia 
established children‘s courts by ministerial order in 1889 and placed these on a legislative 
footing in 1895. 
MIDGLEY, supra note 4, at 19 (citing A. Johnson, A Report on the Juvenile Court of Canada, 21 AM. J. 
CORRECTIONS (1959)).  
10 Julia Sloth-Nielsen, The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Development of South Africa‘s 
Legislation on Juvenile Justice 54 (2001) (Unpublished LLD thesis, University of the Western Cape) (on 
file with author).  
11 DAVID TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 5 (2004). 
12 Id. 
13 See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 27–32 (1985). 
14 JOHN MUNCIE, YOUTH AND CRIME 257 (1999). 
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¶5 A legal concept underpinning the welfarist approach was that of parens patriae, an 
English legal doctrine that allowed the monarch to protect vulnerable parties, usually in 
issues of inheritance or guardianship.
15
  The doctrine was applied more broadly in the 
United States, allowing for the state to act as a ―kind and just parent.‖  The doctrine 
focused on the welfare of the child rather than on the rights of either the child or the 
parents and made rehabilitation and treatment the goals of the system.
16
  The first annual 
report of the Juvenile Court of Cook County,
17
 published in June 1900, proudly 
announced: 
The law, this Court, this idea of a separate court to administer justice like a 
kind and just parent ought to treat his children has gone beyond the 
experimental stage and attracted the attention of the entire world.
18
  
III. THE JUVENILE COURTS MODEL PROLIFERATES   
¶6 The essential features of the juvenile court were not all included in the initial law 
that established the Cook County‘s Juvenile Court.19  Legal historian David Tanenhaus 
explains how the system developed and evolved during the early twentieth century:  
―Juvenile courts, including Chicago‘s model court, were not immaculate constructions; 
they were built over time.‖20  By 1923, the idea of a juvenile court, and what 
distinguished it from an adult court, was well entrenched. 
¶7 The new juvenile justice courts model spread throughout the United States21 and 
was also influential in other parts of the world.
22
  Canada was one of the first countries to 
adopt a similarly welfarist approach.  The child-saving influence was evident in the 
Youthful Offenders Act of 1894, which changed the country‘s tendency to treat child 
offenders in the same manner as adults.
23
  Canada also introduced a measure to allow the 
state to intervene when families were deemed to have failed to raise their children 
correctly.  The essence of the legislation was that a child should not be punished in the 
same manner as adult offenders but rather be treated as a ―misdirected and misguided 
                                               
15 Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 10, at 56 n.21. 
16 JEFFREY SHOOK & ROSEMARY SARRI, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/hrc/JuvenileJustice_Sarri.pdf.   
17 Cook County is the area in which the Chicago court operated. 
18
 WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT: THE CHILDREN OF THE JUVENILE COURT v (1997).    
19 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 ILL. LAWS 131 (1899). 
20 Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 43 (―Most of the features that later became the hallmarks of progressive 
juvenile justice—private hearings, confidential records, the complaint system, detention homes, and 
probation officers—were either omitted entirely from the initial law or were included without any 
provisions for public funding.‖). 
21 See id. at 45 (―By 1925 . . . every state except Maine and Wyoming at least had a juvenile court law, and 
juvenile courts were operating in all American cities with more than 100,000 people.‖). 
22 Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword, in DAVID TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING, supra note 11, 
at vii, viii (2004) (―The invention of a distinctive court for children, a legal polity described by Professor 
Francis Allen as ‗the greatest legal institution ever invented in the United States‘ spread like a prairie fire 
across the U.S. and throughout the world.‖); see also Julia Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 10, at 56–57 (―The 
Illinois court was followed rapidly by other states in the USA setting up their own separate juvenile courts, 
and thereafter by statutes establishing juvenile justice systems in a number of other countries.  In England 
and Canada, for instance the juvenile court dates from 1908.‖). 
23 An Act Respecting Arrest, Trial and Imprisonment of Youthful Offenders, S.C. 1894, c. 58 (Can.). 
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child.‖24  In 1908, Canada passed the Juvenile Delinquents Act,25 which set out 
guidelines for juvenile courts and ―encompassed a number of key philosophical elements 
that strongly reflected its treatment philosophy . . . widely referred to as parens 
patriae.‖26 The system was clearly welfarist in its approach, with wide discretionary 
powers for officials and indeterminate sentencing powers for judges. 
¶8 According to internationally recognized children‘s rights expert, Jaap Doek, [t]he 
introduction of juvenile courts in Europe was clearly connected to developments in the 
United States,‖27 but the development of different countries‘ systems has since diverged 
with the French system remaining the closest to a welfare-based approach.
28
  Although 
the United Kingdom established separate juvenile courts in 1908, British criminal justice 
scholar Anthony Bottoms explains that the model was not fully welfarist.
29
  He describes 
the system as having been a ―modified criminal court‖ model30 until the 1960s, when 
Scotland
31
 and then England and Wales introduced welfare-oriented models.
32
  The 
model in England and Wales has undergone many changes since then,
33
 while the 
                                               
24 D. OWEN CARRIGAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN CANADA: A HISTORY 124 (1998). 
25 An Act Respecting Juvenile Delinquents, S.C. 1908, c. 40 (Can.). 
26 John Winterdyk, Juvenile Justice and Young Offenders: An Overview of Canada, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 64 (2002).  
27 Jaap Doek, Modern Juvenile Justice in Europe, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 505 (Margaret K. 
Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002); see also id. at 509–
11 (noting that juvenile courts in Germany and France, established in 1908 and 1912 respectively, were 
influenced by the Chicago model). 
28 Id. at 515. 
29 See generally Anthony Bottoms, The Divergent Development of Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice in 
England and Scotland, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 413 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. 
Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002); see also Loraine Gelsthorpe & Vicky 
Kemp, Comparative Juvenile Justice: England and Wales, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 131 (Winterdyk ed., 2002) (observing that from the outset the ―welfarism‖ approach was 
tempered with a crime-control approach). 
30 Bottoms, supra note 29, at 415.  See ADAM CRAWFORD & TIM NEWBURN, YOUTH OFFENDING AND 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN YOUTH JUSTICE 6–8 (2003), for a slightly different view.  
Referring to the period between the two world wars, the authors observed:  
At this period the focus remained firmly upon the ‗welfare‘ of young offenders and 
‗treatment‘ necessary to reclaim or reform them.  The subsequent Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933 reaffirmed both the principle of a separate juvenile justice system and 
the assumption that the system should work in a way that promoted the welfare of young 
people. 
Id. 
31 Scotland‘s famous ―Children‘s Hearing System‖ was introduced by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 
following the report of the Kilbrandon Committee.  Lesley McAra, The Scottish Juvenile Justice System: 
Policy and Practice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 29, at  441, 
446 (―The overall aim of the new juvenile justice system was to deal with the child‘s needs, with the best 
interest of the child to be paramount in decision-making.‖). 
32 CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 30, at 7 (―The ‗high point‘ of welfarism in juvenile justice was 
reached in the late 1960s.‖). 
33 See JOHN PITTS, THE POLITICS OF JUVENILE CRIME 110 (1988).  Pitts observes that the process was not 
typified by each generation of reformers learning from previous generations, but rather by waves of 
popularization of new ideas, many inspired by political agendas.  Id. 
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Scottish children‘s hearing system remains one of the few welfarist models of child 
justice still operating in the world today.
34
 
¶9 Welfarism was also the basis of the early models of child justice in New Zealand 
and Australia.  According to children‘s rights author Julia Sloth-Nielsen, the Australian 
system bore many hallmarks of welfarism, including judicial powers over those children 
deemed to be ―uncontrollable,‖ the power of indeterminate sentencing, and a system 
characterized by a more informal atmosphere and focused on the rehabilitative ideal.
35
  
New Zealand formally established a separate juvenile court system in 1925, ―founded on 
the principle that young offenders were victims of their environment and in need of help 
rather than punishment.‖36 
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHILD SAVING MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
¶10 Children‘s rights champion Bernardine Dohrn has described this widespread 
proliferation of the Cook County model as a ―prairie fire.‖37  However, the prairie fire did 
not develop into a ―veld fire‖ in South Africa.  Although the influence of the child saving 
movement can clearly be seen in South Africa during the end of the nineteenth and the 
early twentieth century, a separate, welfarist model was never adopted. 
¶11 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has noted that ―[h]istorically the 
South African justice system has never had a separate, self-contained and 
compartmentalised system for dealing with child offenders.  Our justice system has 
generally treated child offenders as smaller versions of adult offenders.‖38  Indeed, 
separate juvenile courts were not established in South Africa and children charged with 
crimes continued to appear in the adult criminal courts, although their privacy was 
protected through in-camera provisions and a ban on publishing their names.
39
  The child-
saving movement exerted its influence on the system from the last two decades of the 
19th century to the 1930s.  The South African law has historically treated children in the 
criminal justice system differently from adults in a number of ways.  Age has long been a 
mitigating factor in relation to criminal responsibility
40
 and to sentencing.
41
  South Africa 
introduced these different procedures and options relating to children incrementally, 
some through the development of the common law, and others through various 
                                               
34 See STEWART ASQUITH, CHILDREN AND JUSTICE: DECISION MAKING IN CHILDREN‘S HEARINGS AND 
JUVENILE COURTS 12–21 (1983); ANDREW LOCKYER & FREDERICK STONE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN 
SCOTLAND: TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF THE WELFARE APPROACH 238 (1998).  But see A. Cleland, Under 
Threat: Scotland‘s Unique Welfare-Based Forum for Decisions About Children (Mar. 20, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.childjustice.org/docs/cleland2005.pdf (raising concerns that the 
welfarist approach has been diluted by the introduction of the Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004). 
35 Sloth-Neilsen, supra note 10, at 63.  
36 Emily Watt, A History of Youth Justice in New Zealand 2 (Dep‘t of the Courts, Research Paper 2003), 
available at http://www2.justice.govt.nz/youth/about-youth/overview.asp. 
37 Dohrn, supra note 22, at viii. 
38 S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (S. Afr.).  
39 Ann Skelton, Children, Young Persons and the Criminal Procedure, in THE LAW OF CHILDREN AND 
YOUNG PERSONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 161, 172 (J.A. Robinson ed., 1997).  
40 The relevance of age in relation to criminal capacity and sentencing goes back to Roman law.  Dawid De 
Villiers, Die Strafregtelike Verantwoordelikheid van Kinders 276–77 (LLD thesis 1988, University of 
Pretoria) (on file with Tambo Library, University of Pretoria). 
41 S.S. TERBLANCHE, THE GUIDE TO SENTENCING IN SOUTH AFRICA 153 (1999). 
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uncoordinated pieces of legislation representing waves of reformist thinking that created 
ad hoc improvements for children.
42
 
¶12 There is probably no better evidence that the child-saving movement drifted across 
the Atlantic to South Africa than the establishment of reform schools, and later, industrial 
schools.  William Porter, the Attorney General of the Cape Colony, left 20,000 pounds in 
his will for the establishment of ―a reformatory for juvenile offenders.‖43  This led to The 
Reformatory Institutions Act in 1879 and the subsequent establishment of Porter 
Reformatory in Cape Town.
44
  Porter, along with other social reformers in England and 
America at that time, strongly believed that character was shaped by environmental 
influences.  The Porter Reformatory was modeled on the British reformatories of Redhill 
and Parkhurst,
45
 and it enforced a strict regime of work and discipline.  Apprenticeship 
was an integral part of the operation of the institution, providing domestic and 
agricultural labor for local farmers.
46
  Initially, Porter Reformatory was for all races,
47
 
though by 1909 the dormitories were segregated.
48
  In the same year, Houtpoort 
Reformatory was established at Heidelberg in the Transvaal. 
¶13 Industrial schools developed in a different manner.  These facilities were not 
developed as places of detention or correction, but rather to provide state-controlled, 
practical, industrial education in response to a shift from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy.
49
  The first school was established by the colonial government in Cape Town 
in 1894, and another at Uitenhage in 1895.  By 1902 there were nine industrial schools in 
the Cape Colony.  In the rest of the country, industrial schools were established after the 
South African war.
50
  They were aimed more specifically at ―poor whites.‖  Although the 
facilities were supposed to be for children in need of care, the early institutions became 
―a half-way house between the school and the reformatory.‖51 
¶14 Criminologist James Midgley records that in 1897 the report of the Chief of Prisons 
caused public concern when it was revealed that considerable numbers of children were 
                                               
42 See, e.g., First Offenders Act of 1906 (S. Afr.); Prisons and Reformatories Act 13 of 1911 (S. Afr.); 
Children‘s Protection Act 25 of 1913 (S. Afr.); Children‘s Protection Act 25 of 1917 (S. Afr.); Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 (S. Afr.); Children‘s Act of 1937 (S. Afr.).  
43 J.A. SAFFY, A Historical Perspective of the Youthful Offender, in CHILD AND YOUTH MISBEHAVIOUR IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 18, 18 (Christiaan Bezuidenhout & Sandra Joubert eds., 2003). 
44 Id.  Porter was for boys only.  There was no reformatory for girls, and it was not until 1897 that a 
dormitory was set aside in the Cape Town female prison for seven girls between the ages of thirteen and 
twenty-one years.  Id. 
45 Id.  Reformatories in England were established to train convicted youths in agriculture, who would 
mostly be sent to the colonies. 
46 Linda Chisolm, Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A study in Class, Colour and 
Gender, 1882–1939 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Witwatersrand) (on file with 
University of Witwatersrand library).  The educational programme in the early years at Porter was minimal, 
and the majority of children had not previously attended school.  Id. at 38. 
47 Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 10, at 337 n.12 (observing that Porter Reformatory was intended for the 
detention and rehabilitation of children of all races under the age of sixteen years). 
48 Chisolm, supra note 46, at 47. 
49 Id. at 55. 
50 Also called the Anglo Boer War, 1899–1902. 
51 H.J. Simons, Crime and Punishment with Reference to the Native Population of South Africa 31 (1931) 
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of South Africa) (on file with the University of Witwatersrand 
library).  
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being detained in prisons.
 52
  The Boer Republic of the Transvaal government decided to 
establish industrial schools in that region, but the plans were derailed due to the outbreak 
of the South African war.  After the war, the matter was taken up by the British 
Authorities, and in 1907 the first industrial school was established at Standerton, 
followed by a second one near Heidelberg in 1909.
 53
 
¶15 In 1934, the South African government appointed a committee to consider whether 
it was desirable to dispense with the criminal procedure as applied to juvenile 
delinquents, and instead to deal with them ―paternally, on the lines of the procedure 
adopted in administering the Children‘s Act.‖54 The committee‘s report indicates that 
they were fully aware of developments in the United States and other countries, but 
ultimately they decided not to take the welfarist route.
55
  Instead, they drafted the Young 
Offenders Bill, which framed a specialized criminal justice process for children.  This bill 
never passed, so children continued to be taken through the mainstream criminal justice 
process, with a few special measures giving recognition to their youthfulness.  These 
measures include closed court proceedings, assistance from parents or guardians, and 
additional sentencing measures such as referral to a reform school.
56
  
¶16 In 1948 the National Party came to power, and the building blocks for apartheid 
were put in place.  The decades that followed were a bleak time for child offenders, with 
few positive developments in the law or practice.  Corporal punishment and 
imprisonment continued to be used throughout these years.
57
 
V. THE 1990S 
¶17 South Africa only emerged from apartheid in the early 1990s.  By that time, many 
countries were in the grip of a ―law and order‖ approach, with the United States once 
again leading the way.  However, the United States was not then providing any example 
that a new, developing democracy like South Africa would have wanted to follow.  The 
situation in the United States at that time has been described by a number of writers as an 
―assault‖58 or ―attack on the juvenile justice system,‖59 a ―threat to juvenile justice,‖60 and 
a ―crackdown‖61 on child offenders.62 
                                               
52 MIDGELY, supra note 4, at 53–54. 
53 Id.  Initially for both girls and boys, the Standerton industrial school was confined to girls after the school 
at Heidelberg was developed.  Id. 
54 UNITED GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, 
MALADJUSTED OR DELINQUENT CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS 1934–1937 38 (1937). 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 Ann Skelton, The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative Justice in South Africa with 
Special Reference to Child Justice (2005) (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria) (on file with 
author).   
57 DON PINNOCK, GANGS, RITUALS AND RIGHTS OF PASSAGE (1997) (―Until lashings as a court imposed 
sentence were abolished as a result of a Constitutional Court decision in 1995, between 32,000 and 35,000 
young people were beaten annually through the 1990s.‖). 
58 Penelope Lemov, The Assault on Juvenile Justice, 8 GOVERNING 26 (1994); Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 
10, at 83; Franklin Zimring, Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 155 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 
2002). 
59 Gordon Bazemore, Three Paradigms for Juvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 37–68 (B. Galaway & J. Hudson eds., 1996); Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, 
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¶18 One line of fire was directed at the institution of the juvenile court itself.  American 
juvenile justice expert Franklin E. Zimring argued that the juvenile court has been 
remarkably resilient.
 63
  The irony of the 1990s is that: 
―[T]he juvenile courts were under constant assault not because they had 
failed in their youth serving mission, but because they had succeeded in 
protecting their clientele from the new orthodoxy in crime control.‖64  
¶19 Zimring wrote that the enormous political pressure on the juvenile courts in the 
United States during the 1990s derived from the fact that the authorities wanted the 
expansion of imprisonment experienced in the adult criminal justice system to extend to 
the juvenile justice sphere.
65
  These forces did not succeed in dismantling the juvenile 
court model, but the transfer of children out of the juvenile court to adult court 
nevertheless effectively removed many children from protection.
66
 
¶20 The most disconcerting feature of the law and order agenda for children in the U.S. 
criminal justice system has been the tendency to include increasing numbers of children 
(at increasingly younger ages, down to 13 in some states) into the adult criminal justice 
system.  This is often referred to as ―waiver,‖ meaning waiver of the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.  Many of these waiver provisions give increased power to prosecutors who 
have the discretion to make the transfer,
67
 while other systems rely on judicial waiver.  
Many waiver systems are offense-driven; although waiver was originally aimed at 
dealing with the most serious crimes, such as murder, the tendency has been to add to the 
list of offenses that lead to children being transferred to the adult system or to being 
eligible for tough sentencing laws on less serious offenses.  Governance commentator 
Penelope Lemov described the phenomenon thus: 
                                                                                                                                            
Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth 
Crime, 41 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 296, 296–316 (1995). 
60 Margaret K. Rosenheim, The Modern American Juvenile Court, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 357 
(Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002). 
61 Mark Stafford & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Delinquency and Juvenile Justice in the United States, in JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 529–56 (John Winterdyk ed., 2002). 
62 An extreme example of the rhetoric of this attack is typified by the often quoted tirade by Bennet et al.:  
America is now home to thickening ranks of ‗super-predators‘—radically impulsive, 
brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more preteenage boys, who murder, 
assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and created 
serious communal disorders.  They do not fear the stigma of arrest, the pains of 
imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience. 
WILLIAM BENNET ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA‘S WAR 
AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996). 
63 Lemov, supra note 58, at 154–55. 
64 Id. at 154. 
65 Id. 
66  See generally JEFFREY FAGAN & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURTS (2000). 
67 Rosenheim, supra note 60, at 356–57 (commenting that despite the fact that almost all states have passed 
waiver laws the majority of children are still dealt with by the juvenile courts).  However, she cautions that 
―[t]here is strong political pressure to make the juvenile court more punishment-centred than in early eras 
and to replace the power of judges and probation staff with greater prosecutor hegemony.‖  Id. 
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―No state begins with the explicit intention of dragging non-violent 
teenagers into the net of adult court and sentencing.  Rather, a kind of 
bracket creep takes place.  The first round of legislation carefully targets 
youths who commit violent crimes.  In the next round, as public pressure 
builds, lesser categories of crime are added.‖ 68 
¶21 Within a century, the system in the United States had moved radically away from 
one in which a focus on the ―needs‖ of the child eclipsed the ―deeds‖ of the child.  By the 
end of the 1990s, deeds had become all important, because the system was offense-
driven, with the type of offense determining whether the child must be tried as a child or 
as an adult.
69
  As leading juvenile justice scholar Barry Feld observed, this approach does 
not properly recognize differences in development, maturity, capacity, and culpability 
between children and adults.
 70
 
¶22 A deeply worrying result of children being referred to adult court is that minimum 
sentencing laws initially aimed at adult offenders thus become applicable to children, 
rendering them vulnerable to extremely long sentences, such as life imprisonment.  In 
2005, fifteen-year-old Christopher Pittman was sentenced to thirty years for the murder 
of his grandparents in Charleston, South Carolina.
71
  He was twelve years old when the 
offense was committed.
72
  He served the first two years of his sentence in a prison for 
juveniles before being transferred to an adult penitentiary at the age of seventeen.
73
  As 
noted by legal academic Johan Van der Vyver, the institution of minimum sentences for 
juvenile offenders places the American criminal justice system at odds with international 
standards.
74
  Around the same time as Pittman‘s conviction, a twelve-year-old girl was 
                                               
68 Lemov, supra note 58, at 28.  The author comments further that in Florida, which first began to lower the 
age at which children could be tried as adults, the biggest increase in children being transferred to adult 
status has been for non-violent drug offences.  Id.  Something as trivial as possession of alcohol can be 
waived into adult court.  See id. 
69 PATRICK GRIFFIN, PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL 
COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 17 (1998) (reporting that in addition to the offence-
based system, by 1997, thirty-one states had ―once an adult, always an adult‖ exclusion provisions which 
require that once a child had been tried in adult court, all subsequent cases involving him would be tried by 
the adult court). 
70 Barry Feld, Rehabilitation, Retribution and Restorative Justice: Alternative Conceptions of Juvenile 
Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 17, 59 (Gordon 
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999). 
71 State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 151 (S.C. 2007). 
72 Pitmann‘s lawyers raised the defense that he was taking an anti-depressant (Zoloft) at the time of the 
murder, but the jury dismissed this, and the child was convicted of two counts of murder on February 16, 
2005.  Id. at 152.  Imprisonment for a period of thirty years is the minimum sentence for murder in the state 
of South Carolina, and it applies to children as well as adults.  See Meg Kinnard, New Trial Granted in 
Zoloft Case Due to Defense Team Errors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 28, 2010, available at 
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? id=1202463958848.   
73 However, on July 27, 2010, the Court of Common Pleas for the Sixth Judicial Circuit granted Pittman 
post conviction relief based on the fact that his Counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
pursue a plea agreement where Pittman could have pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and potentially 
received a lighter sentence.  Thus, Pittman‘s convictions have been vacated, and a new trial ordered. Order 
granting Appellant‘s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Pittman v. State, No. 07-CP.12-00444 (Ct. Comm. 
Pl. 2010).  
74 Johan D. Van der Vyver, International Standards for the Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights: 
American and South African Dimensions, 15 BUFF.  HUM.  RTS.  L.  REV.  81, 84 (2009). 
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also convicted of her grandmother‘s murder in South Africa in the case of DPP KZN v. 
P.
75
  The Supreme Court of Appeal sentenced her to seven years of imprisonment, which 
was suspended for five years, plus correctional supervision under the terms of Section 
276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 for a period of thirty-six months, 
during which time she was put under house arrest in the care and custody of her mother.
76
  
Unlike the U.S. case of Pittman, the South African court, in light of the best interests of 
the child criterion, placed emphasis on rehabilitation and the child‘s reintegration into 
society.
77
  Thus, more than anything else, the girl‘s age was the main factor of 
consideration for not committing her to detention.  Under the South African Constitution, 
a child has the right not to be detained except as a matter of last resort, and must be 
detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time.
78
  
VI. POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2005 
¶23 Recently, there have been a few optimistic notes in the United States sentencing 
arena with regard to young offenders.  Until 2005, the United States was one of the few 
countries in the world that retained the death penalty for children on its statute books and 
continued to execute offenders who were below the age of 18 years at the commission of 
their offense.  In 2005, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to rule on 
the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles in the case of Christopher 
Simmons, who was on death row for a murder that he committed when he was 
seventeen.
79
  On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of five to 
four, held that it was unconstitutional to execute offenders who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime.
80
  Technically, the Court made its 
decision on the basis of the prohibition on ―cruel and unusual punishment.‖81  First, the 
Court said that in deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to 
consider public views, as reflected in ―evolving standards of decency,‖ and that the 
emerging consensus in the United States was that the death penalty should not be 
applicable to juveniles.  Second, the Court argued that the sentence of death for a juvenile 
is disproportionately severe.  Third, the Court found that virtually all other countries in 
the world have abolished capital punishment for persons under the age of eighteen.  In 
this regard the Court also considered international sentiment against the death penalty for 
children.
82
  This ruling affected seventy-two young offenders in twelve states.
83
  After the 
                                               
75 Director of Public Prosecutions Kwa Zulu Natal v. P 2006 (3) SA 515 (CC) (S. Afr.).  
76 Id  at para. 28. 
77 Van der Vyver, supra note 74, at 82. 
78 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 28(1)(g). 
79 It was not the Supreme Court‘s first opportunity to consider this issue.   In 1989, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles in Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
80 Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005). 
81 Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment for Persons Under the Age of Eighteen Years in 
the United States of America.  What Next?, 2005 HUMAN. RTS. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005), available at 
http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/393.citation?related-urls=yes&legid=hrlr;5/2/393 (follow ―Full 
Text (PDF)‖ hyperlink). 
82 Cf. id. at 607–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the law of the United States is fundamentally 
different from that of other countries, and therefore it was beyond his comprehension why the laws of other 
countries and international trends in the sentencing of children were considered at all). 
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ruling, however, they faced the penalty of life imprisonment without parole, which is also 




¶24 Roper v. Simmons was cited in a recent South African Constitutional Court case 
that dealt with the constitutionality of minimum sentences (including life imprisonment) 
for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.  The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
introduced minimum sentences.
85
  When the Act was promulgated, it excluded all 
children below the age of sixteen from its operation.  Sixteen and seventeen-year-olds 




¶25 The courts debated the interpretation of the provisions relating to sixteen and 
seventeen-year olds.
87
  The question of applicability of minimum sentences appeared to 
have been finally resolved by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v. B, which held that 
minimum sentences do not apply to sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.
88
  That case 
involved a seventeen-year-old boy who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to 
the minimum sentence of life imprisonment.  His appeal against this sentence was upheld 
on the basis that, in the opinion of the Court, minimum sentences did not automatically 
apply to persons below the age of eighteen.  Any sentencing court must have discretion 
when sentencing a child and should thus start with a ―clean slate‖ when sentencing a 
child offender.
89
  The Court found that minimum sentences do not accord with the 
principle of detention as a measure of last resort.
90
  Following this case however, the 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act, Act 38 of 2007 was passed, which 
unambiguously applied minimum sentences to sixteen and seventeen-years-olds, a move 
that invited constitutional challenge.
91
  
                                                                                                                                            
83 U. S. Supreme Court: Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,  
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/u-s-supreme-court-roper-v-simmons-no-03-633.  The USA is one of the 
only two remaining countries in the world that have not ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
84 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Ga Res. 44/25, at Art. 37(a) (Nov. 20, 1989) 
[hereinafter UNCRC], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (―Neither capital 
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age.‖). 
85
 Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997 (S. Afr.).  Sections 51, 52 and 53 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, came into operation on May 1, 1998.  The amendment was initially intended 
to be a short-term measure, but was further amended by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 
of 2007 (S. Afr.). 
86 Id. at § 51(3)(b) (―If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) decides to impose a sentence prescribed 
in those subsections upon a child who was 16 years or older, but under the age of 18 years, at the time of 
the commission of the act which constituted the offence in question, it shall enter the reasons for its 
decision on the record of the proceedings.‖). 
87 See, e.g., Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v. Makwetsja 2003 2 All SA 249 (S. Afr.); S v. 
Nkosi 2002 (1) SA 494 (S. Afr.); S v S 2001 (1) SACR 79 (W); S v Blaauw 2001 3 All SA 588 (CC) (S. 
Afr.); S v Malgas 2001 3 All SA 220 (S. Afr.); S v N 2000 (1) SACR 209 (W). 
88 S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (S. Afr.). 
89 Id. at para. 11. 
90 Id. at para. 22.  
91 Ann Skelton, Constitutional Protection of Children, in CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 288 (Trynie 
Boezaart ed., 2009). 
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¶26 That invitation was answered by the Centre for Child Law.  In an application to the 
Constitutional Court, the Centre argued that the Constitution provides that children 
should not be detained except as a last resort and that a minimum sentence implies a first 
resort of imprisonment.  The court held that the traditional aims of punishment for child 
offenders have to be reappraised in the light of international instruments.  Any sentencing 
court must have discretion when sentencing a child, in order to give effect to the 
requirements of international law for individualization.
92
   
¶27 The Constitutional Court ruled that the Constitution prohibits minimum sentencing 
legislation from being applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.
93
  The court confirmed 
the order of constitutional invalidity handed down by the High Court and declared 
sections of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (as amended) invalid.
94
  The majority of 
the Constitutional Court found that the minimum sentencing regime limits the discretion 
of sentencing officers by orienting them away from non-custodial options, by interfering 
with the individualization of sentences, and by giving rise to longer prison sentences.  
This breaches young offenders‘ rights in terms of section 28(1)(g), and the court found 
that no adequate justification had been provided for the limitation.
95
   
¶28 The Court went on to acknowledge that children can and do commit very serious 
crimes, and that the legislature has legitimate concerns about violent crimes committed 
by children under the age of eighteen.
96
  The court pointed out that the Constitution does 
not prohibit Parliament from dealing effectively with such offenders:  The fact that 
detention must be used only as a last resort in itself implies that imprisonment is 
sometimes necessary.
97
  However, the Bill of Rights mitigates the circumstances in which 
such imprisonment can happen—it must be a last (not first or intermediate) resort, and it 
must be for the shortest appropriate period.
98
   
¶29 Further recent developments in both the United States and South Africa show 
gradual improvements in the law with regard to life imprisonment of children.  In 
Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 majority that sentencing 
juveniles to life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide cases is impermissible 
under the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel and unusual punishment clause.99  
¶30 In this case, Terrance Jamar Graham, the petitioner, committed armed burglary and 
attempted armed robbery at the age of sixteen, together with two other defendants.  
Within the discretion of the prosecutor, according to Florida laws, Graham was charged 
as an adult.
100
  Graham entered into a plea agreement under which the Florida trial court 
placed him on three years probation and withheld adjudication of guilt.  Less than six 
months into his probation, Graham participated in a home invasion robbery and was 
                                               
92 CENTRE FOR CHILD LAW ANNUAL REPORT 2010 4–6, available at www.centreforchildlaw.com. 
93 Brief  for National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Centre for Child Law v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others, 2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) (S. Afr.). 





98 Id.  
99 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018, 2030 (2011) was handed down on May 17, 2010.  Justice 
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. 
100 FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003) (renumbered at § 985.557(1)(b) (2007)). 
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arrested again.  The trial court found that Graham had violated the terms of his probation 
by committing additional crimes.  The court made an adjudication of guilt on Graham‘s 
earlier offenses and revoked his probation.  The court sentenced him to the maximum 
penalty of life in prison without parole for the burglary.
101
  Thus, there was no possibility 
of release from prison except in the rare case of being granted executive clemency.   
¶31 Graham challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause, but his conviction was affirmed by the state‘s First District Court of 
Appeal.
 102
  On appeal, the United States Supreme Court considered the sentencing 
practice of life without parole for juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses to be 
cruel and unusual.  The Court based its decision on arguments that penal theories used to 
justify such punishments are inadequate, that juvenile offenders have limited culpability, 
and that the sentence in question was severe in any context.
103
  Relying on such cases as 
Roper v. Simmons,
104
 Atkins v. Virginia,
105
 and Kennedy v. Louisiana,
106
 the Court looked 
at categorical prohibitions against certain types of sentences for certain types of 
defendants, and held that because this case implicated a particular type of sentence as 
applied to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes, the 
appropriate analysis would be the categorical approach.
107
  Under this approach, the 
Court first considers ―objective indicia of society‘s standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice,‖ so as to determine if a national consensus against the 
sentencing practice at issue exists.
108
  Then, looking to ―the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the Court‘s own interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment,
109
 the Court determines by way of independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the Constitution.
110
  In the words of the Court, a 
categorical rule barring sentences of life imprisonment without parole "gives all juvenile 
non-homicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.  The juvenile 
should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential."
111
  The Court observed that Roper abolished 
the death penalty for juveniles who commit murder, thereby leaving life without parole as 
the maximum sentence for a juvenile convicted of homicide.  As such, Graham‘s 
sentence of life without parole placed him in the same category of punishment as if he 
had committed a murder at age sixteen.  In addition, actual sentencing practices in 
jurisdictions that allowed life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders 
                                               
101
 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.  This was despite the prosecutor having recommended sentences of thirty 
years and fifteen years, respectively, on the two charges.  The defense counsel was seeking a five-year 
sentence, and the pre-sentence report prepared for the court recommended a four-year sentence.   
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, 
―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted.‖  Id. 
103 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
104 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for juveniles). 
105 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abolishing the death penalty for persons with low range 
intellectual functioning). 
106 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (abolishing the death penalty for non-homicide crimes).  
107 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
108 Roper, 543 U.S. at 552. 
109 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.   
110 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
111 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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suggested that there was a consensus against the sentence because there were only 129 
juvenile offenders nationwide serving the sentence.
112
  
¶32 Finally, while acknowledging that the judgments of other nations and the 
international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, 
the Court considered the absence of such sentences in other countries.  The United States, 
the Court observed, was the only nation that imposed this type of sentence on the 
demographic in question.
113
  Relying on these considerations, the Court issued a broad 
ruling that expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment by creating a new categorical 
sentencing prohibition forbidding the sentence of life without parole for non-homicide 
offenses committed by a juvenile.   
¶33 In light of the decision in Graham, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, 
dismissed a writ of certiorari in Sullivan v. Florida as improvidently granted.
114
  Joe 
Harris Sullivan, thirty-three, was also serving a sentence of life in prison without parole 
for a non-homicide offense that he committed at the age of thirteen.  As such, the 
Graham ruling entitled him to a new sentence.   
¶34 In South Africa, there are approximately 100 young men serving life sentences for 
crimes that they committed while under the age of eighteen years.
115
  Under South 
African law, life imprisonment does allow for the possibility of parole, and the pre-parole 
period is twenty-five years.
 116
   This means that the young person serving life, like his or 
her adult counterpart, cannot be considered for parole until twenty-five years of the 
sentence have been served.  The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 sets twenty-five years as 
the maximum period of imprisonment to which a child (fourteen years or older) can be 
sentenced.
117
  Such prisoners are entitled to be considered for parole after spending half 
of their sentences in prison, which would be twelve and a half years for the maximum 
possible sentence.   
¶35 This new provision thus effectively does away with life imprisonment for juvenile 
offenders, which was a sentence under the common law.  Together with the striking down 
of minimum sentences as described earlier in this Article, this new law represents a 
positive step forward in relation to the sentencing of child offenders with respect to 
serious crimes. 
                                               
112 Id. at 2023–25.  According to the Court, of the 129 juveniles serving this sentence, seventy-seven were 
imprisoned in Florida and fifty-two in ten states and in the Federal System.  This means that only twelve 
jurisdictions nationwide, in fact, imposed life without parole sentences on juvenile non-homicide offenders.  
Life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders was available in six jurisdictions.  Seven jurisdictions 
permitted it but only for homicide crimes and thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal 
system permitted it for a juvenile non-homicide offender in some circumstances.  (Thus, twenty-six states 
and the District of Columbia did not impose the sentence despite apparent statutory authorization). 
113 Id. at 2034.  This approach, of referring to other counties, has been used before in Eighth Amendment 
cases.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78. 
114 Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010). 
115 CTR. FOR CHILD LAW, REPORT ON PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES FOR CRIMES COMMITTED 
WHILST THEY WERE CHILDREN (2010), available at www.centreforchildlaw.com.    
116 See UNCRC, supra note 84.  This is in line with the article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child which requires states not to subject children to the death penalty, nor to life without 
parole.  Id. 
117 Child Justice Act of 2008 (S. Afr.). The Act came into operation on April 1, 2010 after a lengthy process 
of drafting, consultation and parliamentary debate. 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
¶36 The turn of a century represents a time of new beginnings. As the nineteenth 
century drew to a close, the Cook County, Illinois, juvenile justice model was born, and 
the first decade of the twentieth century was a time of great social innovation for juvenile 
justice in the United States and in many other countries that established similar systems.  
In 1910 the Union government of South Africa came to power. This followed the South 
African War, and ended the divisions between the former British colonies and the Boer 
Republics.  The legislative developments of the Union government were optimistic and 
indicated a commitment to treating children differently, although the efforts were 
piecemeal and fell short of separate juvenile justice system.  The end of the 1940s saw 
South Africa slip into a deeply negative era.  The apartheid years yielded nothing positive 
for juvenile justice.  A free South Africa re-awakened when Nelson Mandela became 
President in 1994, inaugurated at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, built for that Union 
government in 1910. South Africa in 1994 was brimming with positive law reform 
possibilities.  By then the United States was attempting to extend its negative war on 
crime to the juvenile justice system, which made it an example to eschew rather than 
emulate. 
¶37 The turn of the twentieth century has again been a time for renewal.  The first 
decade of the twenty-first century has seen positive developments for child offenders in 
both countries.  The cases of Roper, Graham, and Sullivan in the United States, and the 
case of Centre for Child Law v. Minister of Justice in South Africa indicate recognition 
from the highest courts that children are different from adults; they are less mature, less 
culpable, and need to be treated in accordance with that reality.  The work is not 
complete.  Child rights and criminal justice campaigners in both countries must strive to 
steer a more restorative, proportionate response to child offenders.  
¶38 Life imprisonment has been abolished in South Africa, but lengthy prison sentences 
have survived into the new Child Justice Act 75 of 2010, and many young people 
sentenced under the previous law continue to serve life sentences.  Life without parole for 
children, still a stark reality for so many young offenders in the United States, violates 
international standards.  The struggle to abolish life without parole for all offenders who 
were below eighteen years at the commission of their crimes—not only those who fit into 
the category of Graham and Sullivan—must continue.  
